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“ABANDONED . . . WITHOUT A
WORD OF WARNING”:
PERSPECTIVES ON MAPLES V.
THOMAS
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT
I. INTRODUCTION
Many readers—especially lawyers—first learned the facts of
1
Maples v. Thomas from an article published in 2010 in the New York
2
Times. On death row in Alabama, Cory Maples sought post3
conviction relief in state court, represented pro bono by two
associate attorneys at the prominent law firm Sullivan & Cromwell.
When the trial court denied Maples’s petition, it sent notice to the two
associates at the firm’s street address, which started a forty-two day
period for filing a timely appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals. But by that time, and unbeknownst either to Maples or the
court, the associates had left the firm. Instead of forwarding the
notices on to them, or redirecting the notices to other attorneys within

David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I submitted a brief as
amica curiae on behalf of the petitioner in Maples that drew on my knowledge of agency law
based on my service as the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006). I am
grateful to my colleague, Walter Dellinger, and his team at O’Melveny & Myers LLP for serving
as my counsel on the brief.
1. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
2. See Adam Liptak, A Mailroom Mix-Up That Could Cost a Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03bar.html?_r=0 (providing a brief summary of the
situation that led Cory Maples to miss the deadline for filling his appeal).
3. Maples sought post-conviction relief in Alabama state court and subsequently in
federal court in his petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. Maples, 132 S. Ct.
at 919. In particular, he alleged “that his inexperienced and underfunded attorneys failed to
develop and raise an obvious intoxication defense” to the two murder charges of which he was
convicted. Id. Trial counsel also allegedly failed to “object to several egregious instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, and [were] woefully underprepared for the penalty phase of his trial.”
Id. Perhaps to place these allegations in a broader context, the Court’s majority opinion opens
with an overview of Alabama practices applicable to indigent defendants—like Maples—in
capital cases. Id. at 917–18. Eligibility requirements for counsel are low, as is compensation. Id.
This comment does not explore the issues raised by Maples’s allegations in his habeas petition.
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the firm, mail room personnel stamped the envelopes that contained
the notices “Return to Sender,” and sent them back to the trial-court
4
clerk in Alabama. The clerk took no further action when the notices
reappeared; local counsel for Maples, who received the notice, did not
act on it. Once forty-two days had elapsed, Maples not only lost the
right to appeal within the Alabama court system, but also, the State
later argued, was chargeable with a procedural default that barred his
5
ability to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court. The federal
6
7
district court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the State. The
8
Supreme Court reversed.
Maples v. Thomas is the Court’s first explicit recognition that
abandonment by counsel can suffice to excuse a procedural default in
the context of a petition for habeas corpus. The Court’s early-2012
opinions in Maples are significant for several reasons, three of which I
discuss in this brief comment. First, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a
seven-to-two majority holds that abandonment by counsel constitutes
cause to excuse a procedural default when the client has no notice
that he effectively lacks representation by counsel at the relevant
9
time. A procedural default under such circumstances is not
attributable to the client because it occurred through no fault of the
10
client. The majority opinion also ventures a generalized formulation
of how “abandonment” might be defined and how a petitioner might
11
show its occurrence.
Second, beyond its technical contribution to the law addressing
post-conviction relief, Maples invites reflection on large law firms, the
organization of work within them, the inevitable hand-offs of
responsibility that occur when lawyers leave firms, and the

4. Thus, colloquially, Maples is the “Return to Sender” case, also the title of a song
written by Winfield Scott and Otis Blackwell and recorded as a single by Elvis Presley in 1962.
ELVIS PRESLEY, Return to Sender, on GIRLS! GIRLS! GIRLS! (Elvis Presley Music 1962). To see
Elvis performing the song, see fairytaledreamerx, Elvis Presley—Return to Sender, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 9, 2008), www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z54-QHEZN6E.
5. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 921.
6. Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879, 885 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom.
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
7. Id. at 890.
8. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 912.
9. Id. at 927.
10. See id. Six Justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion; Justice Alito wrote a separate
concurrence but also concurred in the majority opinion; Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion
joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 916.
11. See id. at 923 (exploring when “abandonment” has occurred, as opposed to simple
“attorney error”).
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responsibility of individual lawyers who are members of teams.
Although this brief comment is not the occasion to give this
dimension of Maples its full due, the case is a useful vehicle for
considering how the same organizational complexities that enable
teams of lawyers to undertake sophisticated matters may also enable
serious errors to go undetected.
Third, and most broadly, Maples affords an occasion to reconsider
the extent to which it is fair to charge clients with the consequences of
12
errors made by their lawyers. So long as a lawyer had authority to
act on the client’s behalf, the client is ordinarily bound by her lawyer’s
13
actions—even when the client is unaware of the error. As Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion points out, the majority’s opinion requires
drawing a fine line between ordinary ineffectiveness of counsel and
ineffectiveness that demonstrates “he was not a genuinely
14
representative agent.” However, to draw such distinctions is
consistent with basic principles of agency law, which operate less
mechanically than many believe. Moreover, perhaps doctrines
external to agency law itself could usefully be applied in some specific
settings, including post-conviction proceedings, in which the stakes are
high for the client and many circumstances may undermine the
quality of legal representation.
II. MAPLES AND EXCUSES FOR PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A. Agency Law’s Implications for Post-Conviction Relief
The specific doctrinal question addressed in Maples requires some
initial framing. In Maples and other cases in which lawyers erred in
seeking post-conviction relief for imprisoned clients, analysis begins
by acknowledging the absence of a constitutional right to effective
15
assistance of counsel in the post-conviction context. When a
defendant has this right, the state, and not the client, is chargeable

12. See Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers’
Mistakes?, 110 MICH. L. REV. 875, 878–84 (2012) [hereinafter Liptak, Agency and Equity]
(discussing the facts of Maples v. Thomas after asking, “why not?” to the question of whether
clients should be notified of an impending dismissal).
13. For the general point that lawyers are treated as their client’s agents, see Deborah A.
DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301 (1998).
14. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933.
15. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488
(1969).
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with lawyer errors that amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Thus, when the client has a right to receive effective assistance of
counsel, the lawyer’s error is deemed to be external to the client.
Separately, a prisoner convicted in state court may not pursue
habeas corpus relief in federal court when a state court has declined
to address the prisoner’s claims because he “failed to meet a state
procedural requirement” and “the state judgment rests on
17
independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” In contrast, a
state-level procedural default does not bar federal review when a
prisoner can show “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” as a
18
result of the violation of federal law alleged in the habeas petition.
Such cause is constituted by the occurrence of “something external to
the petitioner . . . that cannot fairly be attributed to him” and that
19
“impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”
However, ordinary negligence by the petitioner’s counsel is not
“external to the petitioner” and thus does not constitute “cause” for
20
this purpose. The Court reasoned in Coleman v. Thompson that, as
the principal in an agency relationship with his counsel, the petitioner
21
bore the risk of his agent’s negligence. Put differently, negligence on
the part of the petitioner’s lawyer is not defined as “external” to the
petitioner because the petitioner is charged with it, just as any
principal is charged with the conduct of an agent acting within the
agent’s scope of actual or apparent authority. An agent’s negligent
conduct that inflicts loss on the principal breaches the agent’s duties
to the principal, giving the principal a claim against the agent to be
22
indemnified against the loss. Those consequences are internal to the

16. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991)). Whether the Alabama judgment rested on such an “adequate and
independent ground” was raised by Maples in his petition for certiorari. See Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 2, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (No. 10-63). The Court did not grant certiorari on that
question. See Maples v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (granting certiorari limited to Question
2). Question 2 asked, “[w]hether the Eleventh Circuit properly held . . . that there was no ‘cause’
to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the State’s own
conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner’s attorneys of record were no longer
functioning as his agents at the time of any default.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i,
Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (No. 10-63).
18. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749–50 (1991).
19. Id. at 753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
20. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
21. Id. at 753–54.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006).
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23

principal-agent relationship and, at least usually, they do not impair
the legal consequences for the principal vis-à-vis third parties that
stem from the agent’s conduct. However, Coleman also recognized
that the agency relationship between them is severed once a lawyer
withdraws from representing a client, and the lawyer’s subsequent
24
actions are not fairly attributable to the client. This leaves the
question of whether (or when) a lawyer’s breaches of duty to the
client in an ongoing lawyer-client relationship effectively sever the
relationship and might constitute cause. Does Coleman require
judicial indifference to the character, quality, gravity, or consequences
of a lawyer’s breach of duty?
Maples was not the Court’s first encounter with these questions.
Two years before its opinion in Maples, the Court considered possible
25
distinctions among lawyers’ breaches of duty in Holland v. Florida.
In Holland, the petitioner missed the one-year deadline for filing a
26
federal habeas petition prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Court
held that the statutory time limit could be tolled for equitable reasons
and that a lawyer’s unprofessional conduct could be treated as an
extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling.

23. But see infra text accompanying notes 101–105 (noting that agent’s serious disloyalty
may terminate agency relationship or defeat imputation of agent’s knowledge to principal).
24. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753.
25. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
26. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a one-year limitation period applies to “an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
The one-year period runs from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review of
the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)
(West 2012) [hereinafter AEDPA]. This subsection was added to section 2244 by Title I of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). In
Holland, the petitioner’s lawyer erroneously believed that the one-year period imposed by
AEDPA was tolled during the pendency of petitions for discretionary appellate review, such as
petitions for certiorari. 130 S. Ct. at 2558. The petitioner, in contrast, understood the law
correctly. Id. at 2557. But a lawyer’s erroneous understanding of the law is only negligence
(whether ordinary or gross negligence) which does not excuse a procedural default. See id. at
2563 (instructing that “in the context of procedural default, without qualification, that a
petitioner ‘must bear the risk of attorney error’” (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53)). Thus, it
was crucial that petitioner emphasize abandonment by counsel, not counsel’s error.
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Important to the analysis (and outcome) in Holland was the
petitioner’s emphasis on challenging his lawyer’s conduct, not as
27
negligence, but as abandonment. As Maples characterizes the
lawyer’s conduct in Holland, he “detached himself from any trust
28
relationship with his client.” In particular, the lawyer in Holland did
not communicate with his client for an extended period of time, did
not inform him when the state court ruled against him, and did not
file the necessary documents in time for his client to seek review in
federal court. When the client wrote directly to the Florida Supreme
Court to convey his complaints and request a new lawyer, prosecutors
objected (and the Florida court agreed) that the client could not
29
contact the court directly because he was represented by counsel.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Holland, which characterizes
30
as “perverse” the State’s opposition to the petitioner’s request for
new counsel, also articulates an analytic structure to differentiate
between ordinary negligence and lawyer misconduct that constitutes
31
“extraordinary circumstances” excusing procedural default. Error,
however egregious, is not tantamount to abandonment because it
32
does not sever the relationship between lawyer and client. In
contrast, “[c]ommon sense dictates that a litigant cannot be held
constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not
33
operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.”
Adopting this distinction, Maples holds that a client, under agency
principles, is not charged with the consequences of a lawyer’s conduct
when the lawyer has abandoned the client. By severing the agency
relationship, abandonment obviates the basis on which the client as
principal is charged with the consequences of the lawyer’s conduct.
Additionally, a client cannot “be faulted for failing to act on his own
behalf when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact,
34
are not representing him.” This basis for excusing procedural default
requires that the client have been unaware and thus unable to protest

27. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555 (referring to Holland’s claims that his attorney
“abandoned” him).
28. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012).
29. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.
30. Id. at 2568.
31. Id. at 2567.
32. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he error of an attorney is constructively attributable to the client . . .
regardless whether the attorney error in question involves ordinary or gross negligence.”).
33. Id. at 2568.
34. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012).
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or otherwise seek assistance, as did the very aware petitioner in
Holland. Additionally, the client must be unaware of conduct or
inaction that is sufficiently grievous to terminate an agency
relationship, such that the client is, as a factual matter, not represented
by a lawyer whose name remains associated with the case.
B. More of the Maples Narrative
To understand how this distinction might apply, it is helpful to
consider more of the factual specifics of Maples itself, in particular the
conduct of the two erstwhile associates at Sullivan & Cromwell, the
firm itself and other personnel of the firm, and Maples’s local counsel
in Alabama. All members of the Maples Court agreed that the two
35
associates abandoned their client. They left the firm without giving
notice to their client or the court and without seeing to the
36
appointment of substitute counsel. Additionally, both undertook new
employment subject to terms that would not permit their ongoing
representation of a private client like Maples: one became a law clerk
to a federal judge, the other an employee of the European
37
Commission. Within the terminology of agency law, through their
38
conduct they renounced their roles as counsel to Maples. Their
39
renunciations terminated their authority to act on his behalf.
Additionally, treating their conduct as a form of de facto withdrawal
from representing Maples, the associates disregarded Alabama law,
40
which requires leave from the court to withdraw.
In the majority’s assessment, the record is “cloudy” on the roles
that other lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell served in connection with
41
the Maples case. Following the associates’ departure, no other lawyer
at Sullivan & Cromwell sought to be admitted pro hac vice to the
Alabama bar and, apparently, no lawyer at the firm associated with
42
Maples’s case was generally admitted to law practice in Alabama. No

35. Id. at 927 (“[M]aples was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him without a
word of warning.”); id. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I agree that petitioner’s attorneys
effectively abandoned him . . . .”); id. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I likewise agree with the
Court’s conclusion that Maples’ two out-of-state attorneys of record . . . had abandoned
Maples . . . .”).
36. Id. at 919 (majority opinion).
37. Id. at 924.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 119 cmt. b (1958).
39. Id. § 118.
40. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919.
41. Id. at 925.
42. Id. at 919.
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one from the firm contacted the court, and, as a result, the two
associates remained listed as Maples’s attorneys of record, along with
43
local counsel. In an affidavit submitted to the Alabama court once
the default (and debacle) materialized, a partner at the firm stated
that he had been “involved” in the case since the time of the petition
44
to the trial court seeking post-conviction relief. The partner’s
affidavit also stated that he and other lawyers prepared for an
evidentiary hearing after the trial court denied a motion from the
45
State to dismiss the petition. A separate affidavit from another
46
associate at the firm stated that she, too, had worked on the case.
Neither affidavit detailed the nature of the work done and,
interestingly, the same partner also stated by affidavit that the
practice at Sullivan & Cromwell was that “lawyers ‘handle pro bono
cases on an individual basis’” and do not use the firm name on
correspondence or court papers in connection with pro bono
47
representations.
Murky though this history may be, it is clear that filing a notice of
appeal on behalf of Maples required that a lawyer be admitted—at
least pro hac vice—to practice law in Alabama, enter an appearance
on Maples’s behalf, and inform the court that he or she should be
48
substituted for the now-departed associates as counsel of record. It is
also clear that no lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell took any of these
steps in the forty-two days during which the trial court’s denial of
49
post-conviction relief could have been appealed. Thus, the majority
in Maples concludes, no lawyer still at Sullivan & Cromwell was, at
that time, Maples’s authorized agent because none had the
qualification, or had satisfied the conditions, required to take legal
50
action on his behalf in compliance with Alabama law. As all of this
happened unbeknownst to Maples, he lacked reason to know that he
51
was no longer represented by any lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 925.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 931 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This practice may not be typical among large law
firms. It would, for example, lead one to wonder how the firm would identify and address
conflicts between potential pro bono clients of individual lawyers and clients of the firm.
48. Id. at 919 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 925–26.
50. Id. at 926.
51. Id. at 927 (“[Maples] had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had been reduced to
pro se status.”). Analyzed in an agency-law framework, no lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell at
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He also had no right to receive notice himself from the trial court
52
because, on the record, he remained represented by counsel. Thus, as
Justice Ginsburg observed, Maples was “abandoned . . . without a
word of warning” that he lacked effective representation, and left
53
unaware that he proceeded pro se.
An implicit element of disagreement between the Maples majority
and the dissenters is how to define “representation.” To the majority,
as discussed above, a client is unrepresented for purposes of excusing
a procedural default when the client lacks notice that no lawyer
involved with the client’s case has the legal capacity to take action on
54
the client’s behalf that would be requisite to avoid the default. This
definition turns on the agency concept of actual authority (here, to
represent Maples before Alabama courts) as opposed to the broader
range of circumstances under which a lawyer may owe duties to a
55
particular person as a client. In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent
argues that other lawyers at the firm who worked on Maples’s case
also represented him on an individual basis, and thus owed him duties
that included keeping him informed about the case and pertinent
56
deadlines. And presumably any of those lawyers could have
informed the court, entered an appearance, and obtained the right to
represent Maples pro hac vice. Thus, according to Justice Scalia,
Maples was poorly represented but not unrepresented at the time he
could have appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. However, this argument overlooks the fact that no
one in this larger, but ill-defined, cast of lawyers could legally have

that time had authority to act on Maples’s behalf because it would have been illegal for any
lawyer there to take the requisite action. Id. at 926 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 111 (1958) (an agent’s “failure to acquire a qualification . . . without which it is illegal
to do an authorized act” terminates the agency relationship)); id. at 924–25 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 111 cmt. b (the ordinary inference is “that a principal
does not intend an agent to do an illegal act”)).
52. Id. at 927.
53. Id.
54. Nothing in the Maples majority opinion suggests that a client aware that his lawyer
does not effectively represent him, as in Holland, would be precluded from establishing grounds
to excuse a procedural default.
55. Standard accounts of lawyer-client relationships differentiate between the formation of
a lawyer-client relationship, which imposes duties on the lawyer to the client, and a lawyer’s
authority to take action on a client’s behalf. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §14 (2000) (stating circumstances under which a lawyer-client
relationship is formed); id. § 26 (stating when a lawyer has actual authority to act on a client’s
behalf); id. § 27 (stating when a lawyer’s act is considered to be that of the client based on the
lawyer’s apparent authority).
56. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 931–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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taken the action Maples needed, which was to file a notice of appeal
on his behalf in an Alabama court. Indeed, the notice itself is a short
57
and simple document, but unaware of his lack of representation,
Maples had no reason to know that he needed to file the notice
himself, or find other counsel able to act on his behalf before
Alabama courts.
As noted in the Introduction, Maples was also represented by
local counsel, as required at the time by Alabama law when out-ofstate counsel sought pro hac vice admission to practice before an
58
Alabama court, regardless of the nature of the proceeding or client.
In the majority’s assessment, local counsel “did not even begin” to
represent Maples because he told the two Sullivan & Cromwell
associates that his role would be limited to enabling them to appear
59
pro hac vice. To limit his representation in this manner was
60
inconsistent with Alabama law. But it was consistent with local
counsel’s pattern of sustained inactivity, which extended to his receipt
of the notice from the trial court. This prompted no action on his part,
61
such as contacting Sullivan & Cromwell. Tellingly, the State itself
appeared at the time to recognize that local counsel’s role had been
limited and had terminated. Once the time to appeal the trial court’s
denial of relief expired, the assistant attorney general who
represented the State in Maples’s post-conviction proceedings sent a
letter directly to Maples himself in prison (with no copies to any of his
three attorneys of record), notifying him that the deadline to appeal
within the Alabama system had expired, but also informing him that

57. Id. at 927 n.11 (majority opinion) (stating that the “notice is a simple document” that
“need specify only: the party taking the appeal, the order or judgment appealed from, and the
name of the court to which appeal is taken” (citing ALA. R. APP. P. 3(c))).
58. In 2006, Alabama revised the relevant rule, Rule Governing Admission to the Ala.
State Bar VII. As amended, Rule VII does not require that out-of-state counsel associate with
local counsel when out-of-state counsel seeks to represent, on a pro bono basis, an indigent
criminal defendant in post-conviction proceedings. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919 n.3. The majority
opinion in Maples points out that Alabama is “[n]early alone among the states” in not
“guarantee[ing] representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings.”
Id. at 918.
59. Id. at 926.
60. Id. In particular, the applicable rule required that local counsel “accept joint and
several responsibility with the foreign attorney to the client, opposing parties, and counsel, and
to the court or administrative agency in all matters.” Id. at 919 (quoting Rule Governing
Admission to Ala. State Bar VII (2000)). More generally, restrictions on the scope of a lawyer’s
representation of a client require the client’s agreement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19(1). Agreed-to restrictions are not effective unless the client is
“informed of any significant problems a limitation might entail” and consents. Id. cmt. c.
61. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 926.
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four weeks remained during which he could file a federal habeas
62
petition. The State’s lawyer at least believed that Maples was no
longer represented by counsel, given any lawyer’s ethical obligation to
direct communications to the lawyer known to represent an opposing
63
party.
In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion emphasizes that
“[w]hat matters . . . is not whether the prosecutor thought Maples had
64
been abandoned, but whether Maples really was abandoned,”
pointing to local counsel’s “[a]lmost immediate[]” flurry of activity
65
once the prior default came to light. Whether or not the scope of
local counsel’s authority revived or expanded after the default, it was
66
defunct or in abeyance prior to the default. Moreover, the fact that
the State’s lawyer contacted Maples directly is best explained as
consistent with a belief, grounded in experience with the case to date,
that no lawyer then represented Maples. This episode prompted
several questions at oral argument directed to Alabama’s Solicitor
General. Asked Chief Justice Roberts, followed by laughter in the

62. Id. at 920. Maples then contacted his mother, who called Sullivan & Cromwell,
whereupon three other lawyers at the firm made a motion in the Alabama trial court seeking a
re-issue of the court’s order, which would begin a new forty-two-day period for appeal. Id. The
trial court denied the motion, noting that the two former associates remained counsel of record,
never having withdrawn. Id. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied a petition for a
writ of mandamus; the Alabama Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Id. at 921.
63. Id. at 926.
64. Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Within the taxonomy of agency law, one might characterize local counsel as a
subagent, chosen by Maples’s agents (the associates at Sullivan & Cromwell) to fulfill a limited
objective, which was to obtain their pro hac vice admission in Alabama. His authority
terminated when that limited objective was accomplished. A subagent is defined as “a person
appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf
of the agent’s principal and for whose conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the
principal.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006). See id. cmt. e for a discussion
on the termination of a subagent’s authority. Separately, local counsel’s authority would
terminate upon termination of the authority of his appointing agents, the associates who needed
pro hac vice admission to practice in Alabama. See id. Their authority terminated when they
abandoned Maples. See id. (subagent’s authority terminates upon notice, inter alia, that the
relationship between agent and principal has been terminated). Local counsel had “notice” of
the termination, as agency doctrine defines the term, because he has “notice” of a fact when he
“knows the fact, has reason to know it, has received an effective notification of the fact, or
should know the fact to fulfill a duty owed to another person.” Id. § 5.01(3). To fulfill any
ongoing duty to Maples, local counsel should have known that he had been abandoned by his
other attorneys of record. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §
469 (N. St. John Green rev. ed., 8th ed. 1874) (1839) (explaining that subagency is automatically
terminated upon severance of the primary agency relationship because the subagency is a
“dependent power” and because termination “is a natural result from the presumed intention of
the principal”).
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courtroom: “Why did he do it? Why did he do it then? Just gloating
67
that— that the fellow had lost?” And: “What was the point of it? He
must have thought there was a problem, right,” the Chief Justice
68
continued. Replied Alabama’s Solicitor General, “Your Honor, he
certainly was aware that Mr. Maples’s lawyers had failed to file a
notice of appeal. But— and his letter reveals that he is very aware—”
69
at which point other Justices intervened with other questions.
Finally, once the missed deadline came to light, lawyers then at
Sullivan & Cromwell did take action on Maples’s behalf, first in
Alabama courts, up through briefing and oral argument in the
70
Eleventh Circuit. However, once the deadline was missed, further
work by the firm was shadowed by a conflict of interest because, as
the Maples majority explains, “the firm’s interest in avoiding damage
to its own reputation was at odds with Maples’ strongest argument,”
his prior abandonment by the firm’s former associates and the firm’s
failure to respond appropriately and in a timely fashion to the
71
associates’ departure. Instead, before the Eleventh Circuit, the firm
“attempted to cast responsibility for the mishap on the clerk of the
72
Alabama trial court.” To be sure, the clerk’s failure to respond more
affirmatively when the notices marked “Return to Sender” appeared
in the mail could be problematic. One might question whether the
clerk, and the State via the clerk’s knowledge, had notice that
Maples’s counsel of record no longer represented him, as well as
73
whether the clerk had a duty to respond in some fashion. But those
questions are harder to answer than the questions raised by the
conduct of Maples’s lawyers.
C. Maples and Botched Transitions of Responsibility within Large
Law Firms
Justice Alito’s separate concurring opinion characterizes what
happened to Maples as “not a predictable consequence of the
Alabama system but a veritable perfect storm of misfortune, a most
74
unlikely combination of events . . . .” Several media accounts of the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63).
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 925 n.8.
Id.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 106–110.
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 929 (Alito, J., concurring). In contrast, the majority opinion
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Court’s resolution of Maples quoted the “perfect storm” language,
which is prefaced in Justice Alito’s opinion by a list of eight salient
76
factors that contributed to the default. Apart from its technical
implications for post-conviction relief, Maples is also a concrete
illustration of the potential for error when individuals within large
and complex organizations—here, a well-regarded law firm—share
responsibility for work they have undertaken, but specific individuals
leave the organization. This potential for cumulative multi-causal
error surely rings true for many lawyers, regardless of the nature of
their practice.
Two of the causal factors identified by Justice Alito implicate not
the specific actions that a lawyer could be authorized to take on
behalf of a client, but the functioning of a large organization. Thus, in
the midst of the opinion’s articulation of eight factors occurring over
time that led to Maples’s predicament falls “(5) the apparent failure
of the firm . . . to monitor the status of petitioner’s case” once the
77
former associates left the firm. Indeed, partners in law firms and
supervisory lawyers more generally have a duty to “make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform” to rules of
78
professional conduct, which include a duty to “act with reasonable
begins with systemic information about the representation of indigent defendants in capital
cases in Alabama courts. See id. at 917–18 (majority opinion); discussion supra note 3. One
scholar characterizes “perfect storm” as a metaphor that, when used in judicial opinions, “offers
a complete explanation of the consequences of the storm in a way that absolves the human actor
of all blame.” Carol McCrehan Parker, The Perfect Storm, the Perfect Culprit: How a Metaphor
of Fate Figures in Judicial Opinions, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 323, 333 (2012). In the context of
his concurring opinion in Maples, Justice Alito’s use of “perfect storm” seems not to absolve
human actors from blame but to differentiate his explanation from an inference to be drawn
from the majority opinion’s discussion of aggregate characteristics related to representation of
indigent defendants in capital cases in Alabama. Specifically, Justice Alito observes that, “I do
not think that Alabama’s system had much if anything to do with petitioner’s misfortune.”
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring). Moreover, “a similar combination of untoward
events could have occurred if petitioner had been represented by Alabama attorneys who were
appointed by the court and paid for with state funds.” Id. This is not an argument that the
“combination of untoward events” in any way exculpated the lawyers who actually or
hypothetically represented Maples.
75. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Inmate After Mailroom Mix-Up, N.Y. TIMES
Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/cory-r-maples-must-be-given-secondchance-after-mailroom-mix-up-justices-rule.html; Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Rules
for Death-Row Inmate Whose BigLaw Lawyers Missed the Appeal Deadline,
Jan.
18,
2012,
http://www-source.abajournal.com/news/article/
ABAJOURNAL.COM,
supreme_court_allows_appeal_for_death-row_inmate_whose_biglaw_lawyers_misse.
76. 132 S. Ct. at 928–29 (Alito, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 928.
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2011).
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diligence and promptness in representing a client.” And all lawyers
must, upon terminating their representation of a client, “take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client [and] allowing time for the
80
employment of other counsel.” In Maples, steps to protect the
client’s interests would include, at a minimum, notifying him of the
gap in representation and explaining available options going forward.
Separately, Justice Alito’s opinion identifies the performance of
Sullivan & Cromwell’s mail room as a distinct contributor to the
procedural default: “(6) when notice of the decision denying
petitioner’s request for state postconviction relief was received in
[the] firm’s offices, the failure of the firm’s mail room to route that
important communication to either another member of the firm or to
81
the departed attorneys’ new addresses.” Of course, a mail room is
not itself a legal person or a morally accountable agent, nor is it a
naturally-occurring object like a rock formation. Mail rooms have
operational and supervisory (human) personnel, use technology
chosen by human personnel, and often operate subject to defined
protocols or routines. Maples does not address how the error
happened, but more than one person may have shared responsibility.
Likewise, the routine or protocol under which the mail room
operated, or the technology it used, may not have been designed with
a keen enough eye to the possibility of human error.
Nonetheless, many breaches of duties by lawyers and
organizational mishaps within large law firms fall short of the
standard articulated in Maples to warrant excusing a procedural
default. How best to define the standard engaged the Court during
oral argument in Maples. Justice Kagan asked counsel for Maples:
79. Id. R. 1.3. It is not clear how compliance with this rule would co-exist with a firm’s
policy that pro bono clients are those of individual lawyers alone, and are not clients of the firm.
See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing affidavit from partner of Sullivan &
Cromwell).
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d).
81. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring). Sounding a much darker note, a
widely-read blog introduced the term “Mailroom of Death.” See David Lat, Sullivan &
Cromwell’s Mailroom of Death: A Law Firm’s Error Could Cost a Man His Life, ABOVE THE
LAW (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2010/08/sullivan-cromwells-mailroom-ofdeath/; David Lat, Supreme Court Rules on Sullivan & Cromwell’s Mailroom of Death, ABOVE
THE LAW (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/01/supreme-court-rules-onsullivan-cromwells-mailroom-of-death/. The term persists. See Staci Zaretsky, Former Sullivan
& Cromwell ‘Mailroom of Death’ Associate Promoted to Partner at Baker & McKenzie, ABOVE
THE LAW (July 5, 2012), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/07/former-sullivan-cromwellmailroom-of-death-associate-promoted-to-partner-at-baker-mckenzie/.
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“[H]ow do we distinguish between abandonment and simply a
botched, a very botched, transfer of responsibility within a law
82
firm?” Counsel responded: “Well, where you have counsels of record
leaving without obtaining the approval that they’re required or telling
83
the Court, I think that is abandonment pure and simple.” Counsel
continued: “Beyond that, you would look to agency principles,
whether there’s a breach of loyalty . . . . [Y]ou would want to get into
84
the facts, although I think it is a very high bar.” As stated in Holland,
when a lawyer’s breach of duty amounts to abandonment because it
leaves the client without representation, the lawyer’s conduct is
external to the client and no longer that of an agent who represents
85
the client. As counsel for Maples acknowledged, this standard
demands much of petitioners seeking to excuse procedural defaults. It
also requires a fact-specific inquiry into events from which the default
arose.
III. LIMITING AGENCY’S CONSEQUENCES
Most broadly, Maples is an invitation to rethink the validity of the
initial premise that lawyers should be viewed as their clients’ agents
because this premise carries the consequence, as explained above, that
absent extraordinary circumstances the client bears the risk of the
lawyer’s errors. In a recent provocative essay, Adam Liptak questions
86
and challenges the appropriateness of the agency framework. He
points out that agency law “is built on the concepts of free choice,
consent, and loyalty, and it is not unusual to find lawyer-client
87
relationships in which some or all of these elements are missing.
Putting aside “a sophisticated client with money” who may be

82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (2010).
86. See generally Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12. Mr. Liptak is the Supreme
Court correspondent for the New York Times.
87. Id. at 875. Indeed, agency is defined as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on
the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). The
relationship between a lawyer and her client is conventionally defined as an agency relationship.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ch. 2, intro. note (2000) (stating
that “[a] lawyer is an agent, to whom clients entrust matters, property, and information, which
may be of great importance and sensitivity, and whose work is usually not subject to detailed
client supervision because of its complexity”). A client’s greater vulnerability is the basis on
which the law creates “safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided to principals.” Id.
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assumed to exercise free choice among lawyers, monitor the chosen
lawyer’s work, and terminate representation if the lawyer proves
88
inept or disloyal, many clients are “poor, uneducated, mentally
89
troubled, scared, or imprisoned.” For them, the relationship with a
lawyer may seem less than “authentic,” especially when the lawyer has
been assigned to the client by the state or is a volunteer, not retained
90
counsel.
91
Although agency is often termed a “fiction,” like much legal
92
doctrine, repetition normalizes agency’s “fictional” elements. If a
fiction, agency seems to operate in an unproblematic fashion in most
instances. It may even be functionally necessary to understand how
legal responsibility can be ascribed in many settings, including the
representation of clients by their lawyers. However, as Maples itself
illustrates, agency doctrine includes components that limit or defeat
consequences for the principal that would otherwise follow from the
conduct of an agent appointed by the principal. Additionally, agency is
not a body of law with imperial pretensions or imperatives. That is,
sources of law apart from and external to common-law agency may
limit its consequences.
A. Limitations Internal to Agency Doctrine
Common-law agency is not the only body of common-law
doctrine with components limiting legal consequences that would
otherwise follow in their absence. An analogy to contemporary tort
law may be illuminating. Students learn that the fundamental
88. Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12, at 875.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 879. Justice Holmes, for example, wrote of the “fictitious unity of person” as an
intellectually inexplicable underpinning of agency law. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 183 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (1881). Holmes also characterized
agency law as the simple-minded combination of a fiction of identity between agent and
principal, plus common sense. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency II, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14
(1892).
92. As Lon Fuller described the process:
Probably the maxim “qui facit per alium, facit per se” was originally a fiction because
it was understood as an invitation to the reader to pretend that the act in question had
actually been done by the principal in person. But the statement has been so often
repeated that it now conveys its meaning (that the principal is legally bound by the
acts of the agent) directly: the pretense that formally intervened between the
statement and this meaning has been dropped out as a superfluous and wasteful
intellectual operation. The death of a fiction may indeed be characterized as a result
of the operation of the law of economy in the field of mental processes.
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 19 (1967).
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structure of liability for general negligence requires that an injured
person show: (1) a duty owed to him by the injurer; (2) a breach of
that duty; (3) a factual causal connection between that breach; and (4)
93
the loss suffered by the injured party. However, tort law contains
doctrines that limit or defeat liabilities that would otherwise follow
when the standard four-part analysis is satisfied, even when the
injurer has no affirmative defense against liability. As is well known,
even when a defendant’s breach of duty in fact caused injury to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff will lose if the defendant’s breach is not also the
“proximate” cause of the injury—or, in more contemporary terms, if
the plaintiff’s injury did not stem from the risk that made the
94
defendant’s conduct wrongful. Likewise, although the doctrine is less
crisp, many plaintiffs cannot recover if their injuries consist only of
95
economic loss unrelated to any personal injury or injury to property.
Tort law thus contains doctrines that spare defendants from liability
even when a plaintiff establishes the basic requisites for a claim of
liability in general negligence.
Similarly, as Maples itself demonstrates, agency doctrine also
defines boundaries that limit consequences for principals. The
majority’s analysis turns on the absence of actual authority to act on
Maples’s behalf by filing a notice of appeal within the limitations
period. Lawyers may have “represented” Maples in some sense during
that period and served as his agents, but none (in particular at
Sullivan & Cromwell) had authority at that time to serve as his lawyer
96
in an Alabama court. Additionally, agency’s consequences do not
follow in rote sequence because the parties or popular usage label a
97
particular relationship as one of agency. Such labels are not
controlling because “agency” is a legal conclusion made following
98
assessment of the facts of a particular relationship. Likewise, no
standard template inherent in the legal category of agency defines the

93. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671,
1673 (2007) (stating and criticizing the “standard four-element account of negligence”).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 (2011).
95. See generally, e.g., Gennady A. Gorel, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for the
Intermediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (2006); Vincent R.
Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
523 (2009); John J. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 225.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 (2006).
98. Id. cmt. 1.02.
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99

scope of an agent’s authority. Thus, the fact that a cast of lawyers
were associated in more-or-less defined ways with the Maples case
does not mean that each (or any) was authorized to furnish the timely
assistance Maples required.
Agency doctrine also limits agency’s consequence by specifying
when an agency relationship ends. In Maples, for example, the
relationship ended by abandonment when the two associates left
Sullivan & Cromwell for jobs elsewhere that prohibited the
100
representation of private clients like Maples. Additionally, disloyalty
by an agent may terminate the agency relationship. By definition,
agency is a fiduciary relationship, long understood to “disallow the
pursuit of self-interest as a motivating force in actions the agent
101
determines to take on the principal’s behalf.” It has long been clear
that an agent breaches this duty by taking a stance “antagonistic” to
102
the principal because the principal has the right to assume, unless
informed otherwise, that the agent is able to give the principal “that
undivided allegiance and loyalty which the proper performance of the
103
agency requires and that he will remain in that situation.” An
agent’s serious breach of loyalty thus terminates the agency
104
relationship, with the consequence (among others) that notice of
105
facts known to the agent is not imputed to the principal.
In short, just as the Court was able to address Maples’s
predicament within the framework of agency doctrine, that doctrine
contains additional components that might be explored to mitigate
the consequences for clients ill-served by their lawyers. Those
possibilities are more complex and less direct than the simple
abandonment and lack of authority theories applied by the majority
in Maples, and the modest scope of this comment precludes a full
exploration.

99. See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with
the principal’s manifestations, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
100. See supra text accompanying note 37.
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. b.
102. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1189 (2d ed. 1914).
103. Id. § 1206.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04.
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B. Limitations External to Agency Doctrine
The factual sequence in Maples suggests another possible limit on
the consequences of agency. In the sequence of events stated in
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, the blunder in the Sullivan &
Cromwell mail room was followed by “(7) the failure of the clerk’s
office to take any action when the envelope[s] containing [the] notice
106
came back unopened.” Although the majority opinion does not
analyze the legal consequences of the clerk’s failure, Justice Scalia’s
opinion emphatically doubts whether “any notice of a court’s order in
107
a pending case” is due a litigant. His opinion distinguishes the
108
litigation context from Jones v. Flowers, a 2006 case in which the
Court held that a state must take additional reasonable steps to locate
a property owner when a mailed notice of a tax sale is returned
109
unclaimed. The opinion also emphasizes that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure do not treat notice as an
110
absolute requirement.
However, as Adam Litpak argues, it is worth considering whether
notice should be given directly to the client in cases like Maples—that
is, cases in which the stakes for the client are high and it confounds
111
reality to lump that litigant with a “sophisticated client with money.”
To be sure, as Justice Alito’s concurring opinion notes, multi-causal
misfortunes may also befall clients with retained counsel, but the odds
of mishap seem higher for litigants like Maples. These are also cases
in which after-the-fact litigation can be complicated (as in Maples
itself), and notice to the client of an impending catastrophe may be
more efficient. Of course, system-wide estimates of relative costs and
benefits would help. An alternative to imposing a duty to give direct
notice to a client would be to jettison the basic tenet that agency
doctrine, with specific modifications, is the appropriate basic
framework within which to understand attorney-client relationships.
However, this shift would destabilize much if implemented as a
general matter. Even limited to cases in which clients resemble Mr.

106. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 928 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
108. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
109. Id. at 220.
110. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(2) and
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) and 4(a)(6)).
111. Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12, at 875.

DEMOTT (DO NOT DELETE)

58

12/20/2012 1:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE

[VOL. 8

Maples, discarding agency’s basic framework would require difficult
exercises in demarcation among lawyer-client relationships and,
within such relationships, their consequences. Thus, imposing a duty to
give direct notice to a client under some circumstances seems more
feasible. The source for the duty would be the equitable nature of the
doctrine surrounding habeas corpus, such as the principle of equitable
112
tolling articulated by the Holland Court.
A separate question is how best to specify the trigger for a duty to
give notice to a client who is represented by counsel, whether
generally or limited to appointed or pro bono counsel. Potential
triggers include the nature of the consequences about to befall the
113
client, the type of case, and whether a lawyer bore relatively greater
responsibility for an impending default than did the client. As Mr.
114
Liptak notes, Justice Black’s dissent in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.
in 1962 argued that as a general rule:
[I]t would be far better in the interest of the administration of
justice, and far more realistic in the light of what the relationship
between a lawyer and his client actually is, to adopt the rule that
no client is ever to be penalized . . . because of the conduct of his
lawyer unless notice is given to the client himself that such a threat
115
hangs over his head.

In contrast, the four-to-three majority opinion in Link, a civil case
dismissed when a lawyer did not prosecute it diligently, held that
having freely chosen his (retained) counsel, the client was charged
116
with the consequences of his chosen agent’s conduct. “Any other
notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative
117
Again, some system-wide
litigation,” wrote Justice Harlan.
assessment of costs and consequences, taking into account
developments in the fifty years since 1962, would be useful.

112. See discussion supra Part II.A.
113. For an example, see Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that, although no “ironclad” requirement dictates notice to a client of impending dismissal of his
case as a result of a lawyer’s omissions or errors, regardless of whether counsel is retained or
appointed by court, the district court has the power to notify the client and “should weigh the
extent to which the responsibility for the neglect of the case lay with the lawyer rather than the
client” as well as consider “penalizing the lawyer rather than the client”).
114. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
115. Id. at 648 (Black, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 633–44 (majority opinion).
117. Id.
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Finally, and circling back to agency doctrine for an analogy, the
facts of Maples suggest a distinct trigger for a duty to give notice
directly to a represented client: the State’s awareness of facts from
which it may reasonably be inferred that the client’s lawyers no longer
effectively represent him. As discussed above, at some point the
Assistant Attorney General who represented the State in Maples’s
post-conviction proceedings appears to have reached that
118
conclusion. Separately, the court clerk’s receipt of the “Return to
Sender” envelopes at a minimum gave notice that something might be
seriously awry in the representation of Maples, particularly if the
court knew that local counsel in such cases served only to obtain pro
hac vice admission for out-of-state pro bono counsel.
Apparent authority is a long-established basis in agency doctrine
on which a principal may be charged with the legal consequences of
an agent’s actions even though the agent lacks actual authority to take
119
such action on the principal’s behalf. Whether an agent acts with
apparent authority turns on whether the third party with whom the
agent interacts reasonably believes the agent to act with actual
authority and whether that belief is traceable to a manifestation by
120
the principal. When a third party’s belief is unreasonable, the
121
principal is not bound on the basis of apparent authority. In Maples,
the re-appearance of the notices sent to Maples’s out-of-state counsel
marked “Return to Sender” could call into question whether, without
further inquiry, it was reasonable for the clerk to continue to believe
that those lawyers continued to represent Maples. Circumstances that
challenge the reasonableness of continuing to believe that a particular
lawyer effectively provides representation to a client might also
trigger a duty to notify the client directly. Although this duty does not
stem from agency doctrine itself, the extensive body of cases
determining whether an agent acted with apparent authority may
help clarify when agents of the state, like the trial court clerk and the
Assistant Attorney General in Maples, could not reasonably believe
that a client’s counsel of record continued to represent that client.

118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra text accompanying notes 63–69.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
Id.
Id.; id. § 3.03.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The majority’s opinion in Maples is narrowly drawn to resolve the
immediate petitioner’s misfortune with a close focus on the facts that
led to his predicament. The opinion, building on the framework
articulated in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Holland v. Florida,
locates bases within agency doctrine itself to excuse a client from the
consequences of flawed legal representation. Additionally, the case
should serve as a cautionary landmark, illustrating that a sequence of
errors can lead to grave consequences. The case’s broadest
significance may well be pedagogical, emphasizing to lawyers (and
law students) the responsibility due clients from individual lawyers
and the firms through which they practice law.

